As South Korean firms have become increasingly prominent players in the global technology marketplace, the Korean government has become an increasingly prominent player in the regulation of global technology firms.

Since the mid-2000s, the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has investigated, and often sanctioned, global tech firms such as Microsoft, Intel and Qualcomm.  It recently turned its sights to Google.

In 2010, the KFTC significantly revised its guidelines for enforcing Korea’s competition laws with respect to IP licensing.  Those guidelines apply equally to non-Korean firms whose conduct affects Korean markets. 

The US also employs antitrust guidelines for IP licensing, issued in 1995.  How do the new Korean guidelines compare to their US counterparts?

Constantine Cannon recently published an article addressing that question and identifying some similarities and differences.  Click here to read the analysis.

The OFT has referred Great Britain’s aggregates, cement, and ready-mix concrete markets to the U.K.’s Competition Commission, an independent body that conducts in-depth investigations into mergers and markets.

The OFT, which has been investigating these markets since 2010, announced that it has concerns that the markets “are not working well.”  In particular, the OFT notes that  five major players account for upwards of 90% of the cement market, 75% of aggregates sales, and around 70% of ready-mix production.

The big five firms are London-based Anglo American Plc, Germany’s Heidelberg Cement AG, Switzerland’s Holcim Ltd., Paris- based Lafarge SA, and Mexico’s Cemex SAB.

The OFT also believes that there are high barriers to entry, vertical integration, and multiple contacts and information exchanges across the markets.

If the Competition Commission concludes that any feature or combination of features in these markets prevents, restricts or distorts competition, the Commission must seek to remedy the problems that it identifies either by introducing remedies itself or by recommending action by other British agencies.

PoolCorp is a major distributor of commercial and residential swimming pool supplies, products, and equipment.  According to the FTC complaint in In the Matter of Pool Corporation, PoolCorp is the “largest nationwide buyer of pool products, commonly representing 30 to 50 percent of a manufacturer’s total sales.”  In local markets, PoolCorp allegedly has had “a market share of approximately 80 percent or higher for at least the past five years.”    

The FTC alleged that PoolCorp “unlawfully maintained its monopoly power by threatening to refuse to deal with any manufacturer that sells its pool products to a new distributor entering the market, thereby foreclosing potential rivals from an input necessary to compete.”  The Statement provided by Commissioners Julie Brill, Jon Leibowitz and Edith Ramirez in support of the Complaint and Order highlights a lack of independent business reasons or efficiency justifications for the alleged conduct. 

Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch provided a Dissenting Statement in which he claimed there was a lack of evidence of any violation.  In particular, Commissioner Rosch noted that “no entrants were actually excluded” from the markets at issue and that there was “no consumer injury” in this case.  Moreover, Commissioner Rosch found “legitimate reasons” for manufacturers not to sell to new entrants, such as a new entrant’s failure to demonstrate that it offers “adequate facilities, a history of successful operations, and a favorable credit history ….” 

PoolCorp has executed a Consent Agreement requiring particular conduct and reporting practices.

The proposed changes deal with Parts 2 and 4 of the FTC’s Rules of Practice and are designed to improve investigations and to keep up with changes in electronic discovery.

The agency noted that the Part 2 rules were in need of reform because of concerns that modern discovery has become a source of delay in its investigations, especially because “information is no longer accurately measured in pages, but instead in megabytes” and because “parties can no longer complete searches by merely looking in file cabinets and desk drawers.”  The FTC is re-examining the rules to “not only account for the widespread use of ESI, but also to improve the efficiency of investigations.” 

Specific changes include:

* requiring parties to meet and confer with the FTC on an accelerated schedule to resolve electronic discovery issues related to civil investigative demands (“CIDs”) and subpoenas;

* streamlining the procedure to resolve disputes over FTC subpoenas and CIDs;

*  expediting the pre-merger review process by authorizing FTC General Counsel to initiate enforcement proceedings when a party fails to comply with the Hart-Scott-Rodino second request process;

* relieving a party of the obligation to preserve documents for an FTC investigation if a year has passed without any written communication from the FTC.

The FTC is also proposing to amend Rule 4.1(e) regarding attorney disciplinary procedures by providing additional guidance regarding the appropriate standards of conduct and procedures to address any alleged violations. 

The proposed rule changes will be published in the Federal Register and subject to public comment until March 23, 2012.

The FTC has separately approved Rule 2.17 to aid in maintaining the confidentiality of its investigations.  This new rule delays notifying targets of FTC investigations that the FTC has requested information about them from third parties, when such disclosure would tip them off or otherwise jeopardize the investigation.

The FTC alleges that these three competitors violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”) by conspiring to fix prices for ductile iron pipe fittings, which are used in municipal water systems around the United States.  The FTC’s complaint also charges McWane with illegally maintaining monopoly power in the market for domestically-produced pipe fittings.   Sigma has settled its claims via a consent decree, which does not include an admission of liability or monetary penalties. 

According to the FTC, “McWane invited Sigma and Star to collude with it” in 2008 by outlining a plan to raise and fix prices for imported iron pipe fittings.  The FTC alleges that the companies agreed, exchanged information through a trade association called the Ductile Iron Fittings Research Association (DIFRA), and subsequently raised their prices in January and June of 2008.

The FTC also alleges that McWane and Sigma entered into a separate anticompetitive agreement to restrain trade in the market for domestic pipe fittings.  In 2009, as part of the Stimulus Act, Congress allocated more than $6 billion to water infrastructure projects, with a mandate that only domestic materials – including pipe fittings – could be purchased with the stimulus dollars.  The FTC alleges that McWane illegally maintained monopoly power in this market for domestically-produced pipe fittings by successfully persuading Sigma to “abandon” its efforts to enter the market, agreeing instead to act as a distributor for such materials for McWane.

The proposed settlement order against Sigma would prohibit Sigma from a variety of anticompetitive activities relating to ductile iron pipe fittings, including: (1) participating in or maintaining any conspiracy to fix, raise, or stabilize the prices of these pipe fittings; (2) allocating or dividing markets, customers, or business opportunities for these pipe fittings; and (3) participating in or facilitating any agreement between competitors to exchange sales information or other competitively sensitive information relating to the price of these pipe fittings.  The proposed settlement order will be subject to public comment for 30 days, after which the FTC will decide whether to make the settlement order final.  The FTC is scheduled to make its final decision on February 6, 2012.

Although price fixing cases are more commonly prosecuted as criminal violations of the Sherman Act by the U.S. Department of Justice, Section 5 of the FTCA also provides the FTC with the power to bring such cases.  Although uncommon, there is some history of the FTC pursuing price fixing cases, such as the 2001 case against AOL Time Warner and Vivendi Universal for conspiring to fix prices of audio and video recordings of the “Three Tenors” concerts.

According to the complaint in Johnson’s Village Pharmacy, Inc. et al. v. King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., King Pharmaceuticals (which was acquired by Pfizer in 2010) restrained trade in violation of the Tennessee Trade Practices Act and common law by entering into a reverse-payment agreement in 2005 with Mutual Pharmaceutical Company.  In the agreement, Mutual agreed to delay selling a generic version of the drug in exchange for an up-front payment of $35 million and a 10%-30% annual share of King Pharmaceuticals’ sales of Skelaxin.

The plaintiffs, Johnson’s Village Pharmacy Inc. and Russell’s Mr. Discount Drugs Inc., allege that this agreement forced a class of thousands of businesses that have purchased Skelaxin for resale to overpay by millions of dollars.

The complaint follows an earlier antitrust action brought under the federal Sherman Act by SigmaPharm Inc. against both King Pharmaceuticals and Mutual.  In that case, SigmaPharm alleged that the King-Mutual agreement eliminated sales of a generic version of Skelaxin to the detriment of SigmaPharm, which had a development agreement with Mutual.

The SigmaPharm action was dismissed last year because the federal district court found that SigmaPharm did not qualify as a consumer or competitor that could bring suit under the Sherman Act.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that ruling in December.

The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (the “2008 Farm Bill”) required the USDA to promulgate new, and clarify existing, GIPSA regulations on a wide variety of topics.  The final regulations represent a significant retreat from the proposed rules and demonstrate the political power of large industrial meat companies.

As directed by Congress in the 2008 Farm Bill, the USDA proposed several changes to the relationship between farmers and meat packagers and processors.

Many industry observers have long criticized the power imbalance that exists between individual farmers, who have little bargaining leverage in the context of a multi-billion dollar industry, and large corporate meat dealers.  The proposed regulatory changes included rules that were intended to help level the playing field, such as creating definitions of competitive injury, unfair and unjust practices, and undue or unreasonable preferences or advantages. 

None of those provisions survived a year of heated debate and lobbying by the meat industry.

In addition to the notice and comment process, Congress intervened before the USDA published its final rule to prohibit the agency from passing most of the competition-related reforms.  The provisions that did make it into the final rule, such as allowing farmers to decline mandatory arbitration provisions in growing contracts, have come under heavy criticism, and the meat industry will likely continue to push for their repeal or modification.

The European Commission began the investigation in November 2009.  The ongoing proceedings are aimed at examining a possible abuse of Thomson Reuters’ dominant position.  The Commission noted that the use of RICs makes it difficult for consumers to cross-reference data with other providers.  Further, RICs could lock in customers due to the length of time and high costs involved with reconfiguring software applications to replace RICs with a competitor’s product.  If a violation is found, the Commission is able to fine Thomson Reuters up to 10% of the company’s annual turnover.

The settlement offered by Thomson Reuters would allow customers to license additional user rights for a monthly fee.  These licenses would permit customers to use RICs with the codes used by other data suppliers, increasing the number of providers a customer could access.  Thomson Reuters stated it would supply all the information needed for customers to link RICs with those used by rival data suppliers.

The proposed settlement has not yet been accepted.  Competitors, customers, and other third parties will have until January 25, 2012 to comment on the proposal.  The Commission will then determine if it will make the offer binding and terminate the investigation.

A subsidiary of PPHS currently leases Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (“Memorial”), a 443-bed hospital in Albany, Georgia that offers “inpatient general acute-care services.”  Memorial’s “only real competitor”—in the words of the Eleventh Circuit—is Palmyra, a 248-bed hospital offering similar services.  In its opinion, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “Memorial controls 75 percent and Palmyra 11 percent of their geographic market.”

In December 2010, PPHS announced a plan to have a political subdivision, the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (“Hospital Authority”), purchase Palmyra and lease Palmyra’s assets to PPHS or one of its subsidiaries.  The City of Albany and Dougherty County authorities created the Hospital Authority in 1941 pursuant to Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law, in order to address public health needs of the area. 

In April 2011, the FTC brought a federal action to preliminarily enjoin the acquisition pending resolution of the FTC’s related administrative proceeding.  In its complaint for a preliminary injunction, the FTC alleged that the proposed acquisition was practically a “merger to monopoly” that “threaten[ed] substantial harm to competition in the relevant market for inpatient general acute-care hospital services sold to commercial health plans.” 

Defendants took the position that the state-action doctrine immunized the acquisition and planned operation of the hospitals from antitrust scrutiny.  On this point, the FTC alleged that the Hospital Authority was merely a straw-man that was included in the transaction for the sole purpose of shielding the transaction from antitrust scrutiny.  

The district court agreed with the defendants, finding that the state-action doctrine applied and therefore that the defendants were immunized from antitrust scrutiny.  Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  The FTC appealed. 

On de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the FTC that “the joint operation of Memorial and Palmyra would substantially lessen competition or tend to create, if not create, a monopoly.”  However, the court affirmed dismissal on the grounds of state-action immunity. 

The court began its analysis of the state-action doctrine by citing the seminal case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) and the doctrine’s emphasis on principles of federalism.  The court acknowledged that state-action immunity does not automatically extend to municipalities or political subdivisions.  To resolve whether the Hospital Authority, the political subdivision at issue, was entitled to state-action immunity, the court applied the rule announced in FTC v. Hosp. Bd. Of Dirs. Of Lee Cnty., 38 F.3d 1184, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)) that “a political subdivision … enjoys state-action immunity if it shows that, ‘through statues, the state generally authorizes [it] to perform the challenged action’ and that, ‘through statutes, the state has clearly articulated a state policy authorizing anticompetitive conduct.’”  Of interest, particularly given the FTC’s straw-man argument, the Eleventh Circuit did not cite or address the “active supervision” element of California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) and its progeny, presumably due to the statement in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985) that “the active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a municipality.”  

Finding first, that Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law contemplated the anticompetitive effects and conduct alleged in the complaint; second, that the state legislature granted hospital authorities the power to purchase or lease “projects” (i.e., hospitals); and third, that the state legislature “must have anticipated anticompetitive harm when it authorized hospital acquisitions by the authorities,” the court held that state-action immunity protects the proposed plan. 

The appellate court rejected the FTC’s argument that the Hospital Authority acted as a mere straw-man by citing City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991) for the proposition that a court cannot scrutinize governmental actions to attempt to uncover “perceived conspiracies to restrain trade.” (internal quotes omitted).

The case is Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., No. 11-12906, in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Plaintiffs are New York and Vermont dairy farmers.  Defendants are Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. (DFA) and Dairy Marketing Services LLC (DMS).  (Dean Foods was originally a defendant but it settled in May for $30 million.)  DFA is the largest dairy cooperative in the United States, and it not only produces, but also processes, markets and distributes raw Grade A milk.  DMS is a milk marketing agency allegedly created, owned and controlled by DFA and certain other cooperatives.  Some of the plaintiffs are members of DFA.  All of the plaintiffs have, at some point since 2002, sold their milk to processors through DMS. 

Plaintiffs sued DFA and DMS in October 2009 on behalf of all similarly situated dairy farmers in New York, Vermont and ten other Northeast states – an area designated by the USDA as “Federal Milk Market Order 1.”  Order 1 also is the relevant geographic market alleged by plaintiffs. 

Plaintiffs claim that defendants have conspired to fix and suppress the prices plaintiffs receive from cooperatives and processors for their raw Grade A milk, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  As damages, plaintiffs seek the amount they have been underpaid.  As injunctive relief, they seek to enjoin the alleged conduct and require divestiture of defendants’ processing plants.  

Judge Reiss evaluated plaintiffs’ motion under In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006), which requires a “rigorous analysis” of the Rule 23 requirements and “enough evidence” that each of them has been met.  Where plaintiffs lost the motion was on Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, specifically as to impact.  Commonality was satisfied as to “the formation, duration and implementation of the alleged conspiracy.”  However, as to adverse impact, Judge Reiss said there was “a clear failure of proof” with respect to plaintiffs’ expert report:  (1) adherence to opinions that plaintiffs had conceded were incorrect; (2) apparent use of incorrect prices in calculating damages; and (3) failure to consider the existence of either non-conspirator processing plants or class members who benefited or broke even from the alleged conduct. 

However, Judge Reiss also said that the expert analysis “may ultimately prove to be an acceptable means of analyzing causation and damages in this case,” though it is not “presently sufficient to perform this task because too many uncertainties remain . . . .”  Her other findings also indicate potential for success: Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity was satisfied, with 9,000 class members dispersed throughout several states.  Rule 23(a)(3) typicality was satisfied to the same extent as commonality, i.e., as to formation, duration and implementation but not adverse impact, for the same reasons as commonality.  And the 23(a)(4) adequacy of the named plaintiffs could be satisfied with subclasses represented by separate counsel, which would overcome the potential conflicts.  Given that prerequisite to certification, Judge Reiss declined to reach 23(a)(4)’s adequacy of class counsel.  She also declined to reach Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement.

In light of the invitation to renew the class motion, defendants sought to extend their time to serve expert reports from December 16 until whenever plaintiffs serve their new report(s) (if they do).  Judge Reiss denied that motion, finding “no good cause to further delay the provision of expert reports in this ongoing litigation.”  No deadline has been set to renew the class motion.