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August 23, 2010
The Third Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of most of the claims in a massive antitrust class action against most of America’s biggest insurance companies.
Due to their failure to meet heightened pleading requirements, the plaintiffs in In re: Employee Benefit Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation will not be able to pursue their claims of per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs alleged that insurance brokers funneled work to insurers in exchange for payments. But the Third Circuit held that a piece of the complaint, which deals with conduct involving the Marsh & McLellan insurance broker firm, may proceed.
According to Judge Anthony Scirica’s opinion for the court, the plaintiffs’ allegations “do not provide plausible grounds to infer a horizontal agreement” between the insurers to protect each others’ business that would qualify as a per se Section 1 violation. Under the heightened pleading standards that antitrust complaints must satisfy, even though “[p]laintiffs have pled facts showing that brokers deceptively steered their clients to preferred insurer-partners in order to obtain contingent commission payments from those partners, but this in itself is insufficient to plausibly imply a horizontal conspiracy.” Pointedly, the opinion denies that “defendants’ alleged treatment of insurance purchasers was praiseworthy – or even lawful.”
At the same time, the opinion kept alive the allegations involving Marsh & McLellan. There, the complaint contained allegations of bid-rigging that constitute “something more than merely parallel behavior” among the defendants. The opinion similarly kept alive RICO allegations involving Marsh & McLellan, but dismissed all other RICO claims.
The opinion weighs in at exactly 200 pages, and includes 13 pages that merely name the lawyers involved. That might be an appropriate length for litigation that the court called “extraordinarily complex.” As the Third Circuit noted, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaints three times, even after allowing multiple rounds of amendments.
And while the appeals court reversed part of the District Court Judge Garrett Brown’s dismissal, the appeals judges also went out of their way to compliment Judge Brown’s “patient and meticulous analysis.” No doubt, all parties hope that he will continue to offer more of the same on remand.
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Categories: Antitrust Policy and Litigation
August 16, 2010
Thanks to a Nevada federal judge that dismissed its antitrust suit, casino payment company Sightline Payments, LLC, might be experiencing some fear and loathing in Las Vegas.
In March, Sightline sued its larger competitor, Global Cash Access Holdings, Inc., under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Both companies offer services to provide cash access at casinos. According to Sightline’s complaint, “[i]n 2008 alone [Global Cash] processed over 80 million transactions and put more than $21 billion into the hands of gaming patrons.” Sightline’s complaint continues that Global Cash violated antitrust laws through a series of actions, including acquisitions, restrictive agreements with casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City, patent abuse, and disparagement of Sightline. It sued for $300 million, plus costs and fees. Interestingly, the head of Sightline previously served as Global Cash’s chief executive, and also was one of its founders.
In dismissing Sightline’s suit on August 9, Judge Philip Pro held that Sightline did not allege that Global Cash used its market share to engage in monopoly pricing or that Global Cash’s alleged disparagement of Sightline contained any falsehoods. Regarding Global Cash’s restrictive agreements, Judge Pro wrote that “[a]n agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor to establish an exclusive distributorship does not, standing alone, violate antitrust law unless the agreement is intended to, or actually does harm competition in the relevant market.” Sightline’s complaint, he continued, did not allege facts to meet that standard.
According to press reports, Sightline plans to roll the dice again by appealing the dismissal. It looks like the company hopes its lawsuit won’t be leaving Las Vegas’ courts anytime soon.
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Categories: Antitrust Policy and Litigation
July 26, 2010
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ruled that state antitrust laws’ treatment of indirect purchaser claims are too disparate to meet the predominance and commonality requirements of Rule 23.
In Sullivan v. DB Investments Inc., plaintiffs alleged anticompetitive conduct in the diamond industry by the De Beers group of companies, the South African conglomerate synonymous with diamond production and distribution. Settlement discussions led to separate agreements for two plaintiff classes, one class for direct purchasers with federal law claims and one class for indirect purchasers with state law claims, for a total of $295 million. De Beers agreed not to contest certification of the settlement classes and sought to dispose of claims in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey approved the settlements under Rule 23.
And that’s where things got interesting.
The settlement process allowed class members to object to the proposed agreement, and 36 members of the indirect purchaser class filed objections. The objecting indirect purchasers argued that many jurisdictions limit or deny the right of indirect purchasers to antitrust damages. For example, New York State provides a cause of action for indirect purchasers while New Jersey does not. Nevertheless, the district court overruled the objection because the facts were similar for all indirect purchasers and De Beers itself had requested release from claims in all jurisdictions.
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the lower court’s reasoning and emphasized the diverse landscape of state antitrust law. The 50 states are split over whether indirect purchasers can pursue antitrust claims for damages. Roughly half of the states have enacted laws contrary to the spirit of the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Illinois Brick v. Illinois, which foreclosed indirect purchasers from suing for damages under federal antitrust law. According to the Third Circuit, the district court exceeded its discretion “to certify a nationwide class when the legal right shared by class members purportedly arises under the laws of multiple jurisdictions, but only some of those jurisdictions extend standing to class members to enforce that right.” click here for more »
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Categories: Antitrust Policy and Litigation
July 21, 2010
A proposed joint venture between cable giant Comcast and media titan NBC Universal has cleared a major hurdle as European antitrust regulators have blessed the deal.
Because of significant differences between the assets involved in the American and European aspects of the deal, however, it seems likely that U.S. regulators will continue to scrutinize the venture more rigorously.
Comcast is America’s largest cable company and second largest internet service provider. NBC owns major stakes in television, film, and cable programming as well as a major share in online streaming television service Hulu. Under the deal, announced December 3, 2009, Comcast would buy a majority stake in NBC from its parent, General Electric. As a result, Comcast and NBC would form a joint venture owned 51% by Comcast and 49% by NBC; Comcast would also manage the venture. The deal is valued at $37 billion.
The European Commission has announced that the deal “would not significantly impede effective competition in the European Economic Area or any substantial part of it.” But they pointedly noted that in Europe, unlike in the U.S., Comcast owns no cable assets. Thus in Europe the deal creates no vertical relationship between a Comcast cable distribution platform and NBC’s programming assets. Such a relationship would, however, result from the U.S. portion of the deal.
This vertical relationship was one of several concerns raised by opponents of the deal in a public comment period offered by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, which has jurisdiction to review the deal. The venture’s opponents believe it will lead to higher cable bills, fewer independent programmers and less public-service programming. Comcast and NBC will formally respond to the public comments later this month. But they have already argued that the deal would be a boon to consumers by improving broadcast operations, pressuring cable networks to lower prices and improve quality, and speeding the development of “anytime, anywhere” video service. And they say the post-venture NBC would still only account for 12% of national cable network advertising and affiliate revenues, hardly enough to dominate cable advertising.
The FCC and the U.S. Justice Department, which shares jurisdiction over the deal, are expected to decide by year-end whether to approve or deny the deal or approve it with conditions, such as asset divestitures.
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Categories: Antitrust Policy and Litigation, International Competition Issues
July 19, 2010
SmithKline Beecham Corp. may be breathing a little easier for now as a result of a temporary denial of class certification in the antitrust litigation that seeks to hold the pharmaceutical company liable for delaying generic versions of the nasal spray Flonase.
Judge Anita B. Brody of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ordered the plaintiffs to rebrief their motion by September 30 in light of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s ruling a day earlier in a price-fixing class action against diamond company De Beers SA.
A day before Judge Brody’s ruling, the Third Circuit vacated a $295 million settlement in the De Beers case, Sullivan v. DB Investments Inc. The Third Circuit held that the district court failed to properly ascertain whether class certification was appropriate. In vacating the De Beers settlement, the appeals court found that the lower court had not addressed differences among the state laws at issue in the case.
The De Beers ruling could have significant implications for the plaintiffs in the Flonase antitrust litigation because they are seeking the certification of multiple classes based on various state and federal laws. Each of the potential classes seeks to represent individuals and entities that purchased Flonase or its generic equivalent from May 19, 2004, until the full effects of generic competition had been felt.
The court had previously allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with allegations that Glaxo SmithKline (formed by the merger of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham in 2000) caused them to overpay for Flonase by repeatedly filing sham citizen petitions that stalled the entry of generic nasal sprays into the market. Citizen petitions can be filed with the FDA while approval of a generic drug is pending to express concerns about a product or request that the FDA take administrative action. Congress passed a law in 2007 permitting the FDA to summarily dismiss citizen petitions to stop drug companies from abusing the process to extend monopolies.
Judge Brody’s ruling temporarily denying class certification may turn out to be only a hiccup in plaintiffs’ quest for class certification. That said, in seeking class certification, the plaintiffs will need to fully address the differences among the various state and federal laws at issue or risk certification being denied yet again. Until they achieve the requested class certification, it is the plaintiffs who cannot breath easy.
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Categories: Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Policy and Litigation
July 14, 2010
Judge James Ware of the Northern District of California has granted a motion for certification of a class of iPhone consumers in an antitrust suit against Apple and AT&T. An estimated 15 to 20 million U.S. iPhone purchasers are potential members of the class.
Filed in 2007, the suit alleges that Apple and AT&T secretly agreed to restrict iPhone service for five years. Although plaintiffs purchased a two-year service agreement which could be terminated at any time by paying a $175 fee, the suit alleges that Apple and AT&T ensured that iPhone users are still locked in to AT&T, as the iPhone won’t work on any other compatible network – such as T-Mobile.
In 2008, the court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged the existence of two “iPhone aftermarkets” – one for iPhone voice and data service and one for iPhone applications. In ruling on class certification, the court rejected the argument that determining market power in the aftermarkets would require “individualized inquiry” into whether each class member “knowingly and voluntarily” gave the defendants this market power because they knew about AT&T exclusivity and Apple’s control over iPhone apps. The court held that “whether consumers of iPhones ‘knowingly’ entered into de facto commitments to be monopolized can be analyzed on a class-wide basis.”
Likewise, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ damages expert failed to raise a common question because he analyzed the broader value of a customer’s ability to switch carriers rather than the impact of defendants’ specific challenged practices – the non-disclosure of the five-year exclusivity agreement. The court concluded that the broader analysis was plausible.
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Categories: Antitrust Policy and Litigation
June 18, 2010
Cooperation among competitors is usually the kind of activity that raises antitrust concerns. However, with thousands of barrels of dirty crude oil spilling into the Gulf of Mexico on a daily basis, the head of Federal Trade Commission is seeking to ease concerns that cooperation among competing energy companies to help the federal government solve the crisis in the Gulf would face scrutiny under federal antitrust laws.
In response to a letter from Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy seeking the FTC’s position on such collaboration, FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz wrote that “[a]lthough we must always be watchful when competitors collaborate, industry efforts to work with Federal officials and provide expertise to combat this ecological disaster are unlikely to raise concerns under the antitrust laws, and we would be unlikely to challenge such an effort.” Chairman Leibowitz added that the “impact of the oil spill appears likely to be an enormous tragedy for the people and economy of the Gulf and we would like to help any way that we can.”
The issue of collaboration among energy companies was raised because BP officials have acknowledged that they were not technologically prepared to deal with a disaster such as the one now unfolding in the Gulf of Mexico. A number of BP’s competitors, including ExxonMobile, Royal Dutch Shell and Chevron, have provided support to BP and government officials to help get the oil leak under control.
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Categories: Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Policy and Litigation
June 16, 2010
The Supreme Court of Canada has denied defendants leave to appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s certification decision in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v Infineon Technologies AG – the DRAM price-fixing class action.
The B.C. Court of Appeal’s earlier decision certifying a class of direct and indirect purchasers of DRAMs (semiconductor memory chips also known as “dynamic random access memory”) remains therefore the definitive pronouncement on the law on class certifications in competition cases in Canada. As previously discussed, the B.C. Court of Appeal’s decision lowered somewhat the threshold for class certification –allowing plaintiffs at the certification stage to show a “credible and plausible methodology” for addressing damages on a class-wide basis and finding that the certification judge had erred when he subjected plaintiff’s expert to “rigorous scrutiny.”
The B.C. Court of Appeal had found that it could be possible for plaintiffs to prove that the manufacturers benefitted from their wrongful conduct, and thus prove liability on a class-wide basis as a common issue. The Court of Appeal had noted that guilty pleas to the conspiracy charges in the United States and manufacturers’ agreements to pay fines calculated as a function of the gross pecuniary gain they derived from the crime amounted to “admissions that they engaged in the wrongful conduct alleged by the appellant and that they obtained an unlawful benefit from that conduct.”
Time will tell whether the decision will result in more competition class action proceedings in Canada – a country where there have been very few contested competition class action certification hearings to date.
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Categories: Antitrust Policy and Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing, International Competition Issues
June 10, 2010
While it may not really be always sunny in Philadelphia, it’s certainly a bright day for plaintiffs in the In re Processed Eggs Antitrust Litigation, who have announced that Land O’Lakes Inc. and two of its subsidiaries, Moark and Norco Ranch Inc., have agreed to settle the egg price-fixing case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for $25 million and a promise to cooperate in litigation against the remaining defendants.
Direct purchasers of shell eggs and egg products filed this class action in 2008 against several egg producers alleging that they participated in an industry wide price-fixing conspiracy. They also allege that several egg trade associations, including United Egg Producers and United States Egg Marketers, coordinated the conspiracy. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants conspired to restrict the egg supply through hen reductions, cage space requirements and exporting eggs at a loss which allegedly raised the price of eggs and egg products.
The plaintiffs previously settled with Sparboe Farms. Remaining defendants include other egg producers such as Cal-Maine Foods Inc., Michael Foods Inc., and Rose Acre Farms.
The current settlement covers all direct purchasers of eggs and egg products since 2000 and is awaiting approval by the court.
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Categories: Antitrust Policy and Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
May 24, 2010
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of plaintiff American Needle and a more expansive view of the scope of antitrust law today with what may well turn out to be a landmark opinion in the much anticipated case of American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League.
The decision rejects the lower courts’ broad grant of immunity to joint ventures from the conspiracy prohibition of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
American Needle, the plaintiff-petitioner and a manufacturer of NFL-licensed headwear, claimed that the NFL acted anticompetitively by granting Reebok the exclusive license for certain NFL paraphernalia. The trial court granted summary judgment to the NFL, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both lower courts held that, in licensing individual team and NFL trademarks, the NFL was operating as a single entity under antitrust law – as opposed to multiple, collectively acting ball clubs – and thus was immune from the conspiracy prohibition of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court held unanimously that the NFL clubs are not immune from the conspiracy prohibition of the Sherman Act – at the very least with respect to licensing their intellectual property. The Court’s language also indicates that the Court likely would hold the NFL clubs subject to the conspiracy prohibition with respect to the full panoply of the NFL’s operations.
The Court rejected the NFL’s position that, because everything the NFL does promotes NFL professional football, the NFL is really an integrated single entity immune from the conspiracy prohibition. The Court also rejected the middle-of-the-road rule suggested by the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, which would not apply the conspiracy prohibition if “the teams and the league . . . have effectively merged the relevant aspects of their operations.”
Most importantly, the Court took the opportunity to restate and clarify the principles governing when to apply the Sherman Act’s conspiracy prohibition. Thus, American Needle will govern the application of antitrust law in all industries, not just professional sports, as evidenced by the submission of an amicus brief by Visa and MasterCard in the payments industry. (Visa and MasterCard are public corporations owned by separate legal entities, including banks that were members of Visa and MasterCard when Visa and MasterCard were organized as joint ventures.) click here for more »
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Categories: Antitrust Enforcement, Antitrust Policy and Litigation, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law
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