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September 6, 2011
A federal judge in Massachusetts has dismissed a putative class action that claimed that U-Haul International Inc. and its parent company, Amerco engaged in a truck rental price-fixing scheme.
The plaintiff in Liu v. Amerco alleged that U-Haul and Amerco engaged in an unfair or deceptive act in violation of Massachusetts law, and caused prices for truck rentals to rise, by inviting competitor Avis Budget Group Inc. to collude on prices
In dismissing the class action, Judge George A. O’Toole of the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts held that the complaint did not adequately assert an injury to the named plaintiff, who alleged she paid more for truck rentals as a result of the defendants’ alleged invitation to fix prices.
Judge O’Toole held that an allegation of illegal conduct increasing market prices is not enough, and that an actual showing of specific harm to the plaintiff is required. According to the court, such a showing could be based on information on the rates paid by class members for one-way truck rentals as well as available competitor rates.
This lawsuit followed a 2010 settlement between U-Haul and the FTC based on allegations that U-Haul invited competitors to join a conspiracy which, if carried out, would have resulted in higher prices. The settlement enjoined U-Haul from colluding or inviting collusion for a 20-year period.
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Categories: Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
September 1, 2011
After more than four years of litigation, AstraZeneca has agreed to pay $2.5 million to settle State of Idaho v. Alpharma USPD Inc. et al., an action brought by the Idaho attorney general alleging that the pharmaceutical company violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act by inflating the average wholesale price of its drugs.
The Idaho attorney general brought the lawsuit against various pharmaceutical companies, alleging that the companies falsely reported the average wholesale price of their drugs. As Idaho Medicaid sets reimbursement rates based primarily on the reported average wholesale price of various drugs, these inflated prices caused Idaho Medicaid to pay higher reimbursements than it would have had the true price of the drugs been reported.
Idaho Attorney General Lawrence Wasden stated that, “where published prices are false or misleading, the taxpayers are significantly harmed by excessive Medicaid reimbursements.”
According to Wasden, the attorney general’s investigation “revealed that the reported average wholesale price often is not related to the actual wholesale price paid for the drug.” Indeed, the attorney general found that the average wholesale price of AstraZeneca’s heartburn drug Prilosec was inflated by 26 percent.
Wasden confirmed that the $2.5 million payment will be used to reimburse taxpayers for these overcharges. Approximately $1.5 million will go to the state’s Cooperative Welfare Fund and will be applied as a credit against the federal government’s next payment to Idaho Medicaid, over $620,000 will be deposited in the state’s General Fund and $50,000 will go toward reimbursing the attorney general for investigative and legal costs.
The AstraZeneca settlement follows settlements by other defendants to the lawsuit, including Teva Pharmaceuticals, Barr Laboratories, Inc., and Sandoz, Inc. The claims against the remaining defendants, including Johnson & Johnson and Merck, are slated for trial starting later this year.
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Categories: Antitrust and Price Fixing
August 31, 2011
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has denied a motion in the In re Fasteners Antitrust Litigation class action to dismiss antitrust claims alleging that YKK and other fastener manufacturers engaged in price fixing.
Defendants sought dismissal of the claims on grounds of statute of limitations and lack of evidence.
The class action was filed in May 2010, by apparel manufacturers who alleged that YKK, Scovill Fasteners, Coats, and the Prym Group conspired to fix prices and allocate customers in the market for fasteners, a category which includes zippers, buttons, snaps, and hooks. From the early 1990’s through 2007, defendants allegedly participated in meetings to discuss prices, divide markets, and share business information.
U.S. apparel manufacturers began alleging illegal activity by the fastener manufacturers after a 2007 announcement by the European Commission fining the defendants for cartelizing the European and worldwide markets. This finding caused over 35 suits to be filed in U.S. District Courts between 2007 and 2010. The individual suits were consolidated into the class action.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants concealed their conspiracy and due diligence would not have led class members to its discovery. The class contends that there should be an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations until 2007, when they were made aware of the cartel by the European Commission’s announcement.
While the District Court did not grant the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, the claims could still fail on that ground if a determination on the merits results in a denial of equitable tolling. The District Court also found that the class sufficiently pled the existence of a conspiracy and antitrust injury.
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Categories: Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
August 17, 2011
A class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleges that Apple and five major publishers engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy to block competition from Amazon’s e-reader, the Kindle.
The complaint in Petru et al. v. Apple, Inc. et al. alleges that prior to the launch of Apple’s iPad, Apple, HarperCollins, Penguin, Simon & Schuster, Macmillan, and Hachette Book Group violated federal and California state antitrust laws by conspiring to fix the prices of electronic books (e-books).
The plaintiffs contend that Apple was threatened by the popularity of Amazon’s Kindle and the potential that it would edge out Apple products in the market for mobile digital media devices.
According to the complaint, Apple wanted to protect its e-books from the price competition of Amazon, Sony and other e-book distributers that were selling e-books for $9.99. The complaint claims that Apple sought to engineer an increase in Amazon’s prices in order to allow Apple’s iPad to better compete in the market for e-readers.
Plaintiffs allege that Apple orchestrated an agreement among publishers to sell e-books through an agency model. This type of arrangement allowed publishers, not distributers, to set prices. The agency model allegedly eliminated price competition among distributers. According to the complaint, this model caused prices for e-books to rise by 30 to 50%, while the prices of hardcopy books remained constant in a competitive market.
If the class is certified, it will include purchasers of e-books from the five publisher defendants after the adoption of the agency model.
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Categories: Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
August 10, 2011
Plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy among manufacturers of drives that play CDs and other optical discs are going to have to refocus their allegations in order to screen their claims of price-fixing in federal court.
Judge Richard Seeborg of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California has granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss each of the plaintiffs’ consolidated complaints, with leave to amend, in the case of In re Optical Disk Drive Antitrust Litigation.
The complaints in this Multi-District Litigation allege a conspiracy among defendants to fix the prices of Optical Disc Drives (“ODDs”) and Optical Disc Drive Products (“ODD Products”) in violation of the Sherman Act and state antitrust law. ODDs are disc drives that use laser light to read and write data in optical discs, such as CDs, DVDs and Blu-Ray discs.
In granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court focused on definitional inconsistencies in the complaints of the plaintiffs, who include a putative class of direct purchasers and indirect purchasers of ODDs and ODD Products. To provide clarity, the court defined ODDs as “optical disc drive mechanisms built to be incorporated into either (1) stand-alone CD, DVD, or Blue-Ray players and records, whether for audiovisual or computer use, (2) computers, (3) game consoles, or (4) camcorders.” The court defined ODD devices as “all such products (including the stand-alone players and recorders) that include ODDs.”
The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the “direct purchaser” plaintiffs’ complaint under the federal Illinois Brick doctrine, under which only direct purchasers have standing to seek damages for price-fixing violations. The court stated that “the likelihood is that most, if not all, the plaintiffs only purchased ODD devices,” rather than actual ODDs. Accordingly, the court found that the direct purchaser plaintiffs were not, in fact, direct purchasers under Illinois Brick, due partially to the complaint’s definitional confusion and partially to the complaint’s lack of factual support. Moreover, the court found the alleged conspiracy implausible as the number of entities needed to participate in the alleged conspiracy would be vast and the type of entities would be highly differentiated. Finally, the court found the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient under the Twombly pleading standards.
The court dismissed the indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ complaint on similar grounds, concluding that the complaint did not satisfy the plausibility standard. The court took particular aim at the implausibility of the allegations of bid-rigging in auctions conducted by HP and Dell, which claimed the two companies were both co-conspirators and victims.
In dismissing the complaints with leave to amend, the court gave plaintiffs 30 days to remedy the insufficiencies of their allegations.
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Categories: Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
July 19, 2011
A combination of a failure to pursue discovery and vague allegations have led Judge Legrome D. Davis of the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware to grant summary judgment, dismissing price-fixing claims in Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. Bristow Group Inc..
Plaintiff Superior Offshore is a purchaser of helicopter services to offshore oil and gas sites. Defendants Era Helicopters, LLC, Era Group Inc., Era Aviation, Inc., Bristow Group, Inc., PHI, Inc., and Seacor Holdings Inc., provide the helicopter services. On behalf of all purchasers of defendants’ helicopter services from 2001 to 2005, Superior alleged that defendants had illegally agreed to fix prices in per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Superior’s original complaint was dismissed last year on the ground that Superior had alleged only parallel pricing that did not “justif[y] an inference of conspiracy or state[] a plausible claim of price-fixing.” Although Superior had failed to conduct discovery, it sought leave to file an amended complaint based on “newly discovered evidence.” The court permitted Superior to file an amended complaint based on three new paragraphs that alleged that in early 2001, a Bristow sales manager “believed he overheard” a conversation between a Bristow sales VP and competitor PHI’s sales manager in which the two men agreed to a major price increase and noted that the Era defendants had also agreed to the increase.
Judge Davis, however, limited discovery to the allegations in the three new paragraphs. Specifically, he allowed depositions of only the four individuals involved in or the subject of the alleged overheard conversation, and he permitted the parties to request additional discovery relating only to the new allegations. Superior ultimately deposed only two of the four permitted witnesses
Judge Davis granted defendants summary judgment because the sales manager’s testimony about the sole disputed fact in the case – the conversation he allegedly overheard – failed to create a genuine issue of fact. He could not recall what was actually said, who said it, or whether he heard the entire conversation. He was also “mistaken in his surmise as to who was on the other side of the conversation” and “who purportedly authorized” the VP he overheard to make the alleged statements. Thus the manager’s “testimony provide[d] only his personal feelings, beliefs and speculation about the content of the conversation,” which was not enough to withstand summary judgment.
Superior’s cross-motion for additional discovery was denied because Judge Davis saw no reason such discovery would be fruitful. Superior had identified only “hopes” and “beliefs” about what additional discovery might show, which was “insufficient to establish a cognizable need for additional discovery.” Further, Judge Davis noted that although “[d]efendants’ motion to dismiss . . . did not prevent Plaintiff from proceeding with discovery [and] put Plaintiff on notice of shortcomings in its proof . . . Plaintiff did not initiate discovery to support its allegations with facts.” In other words, plaintiff’s its discovery was too little too late.
Finally, Judge Davis found Superior’s broad, 11th-hour request to be a desperate fishing expedition: “The discovery net is cast wide because the foundation for the requests is purely speculative. No facts have been presented that suggest further discovery would remedy [the sales manager's] conjecture and speculation.”
The moral of this story is directed to plaintiffs: Begin discovery early, and get as much as you can while you can get it. Unfortunately, Superior Offshore learned this lesson the hard way.
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Categories: Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
July 7, 2011
Huntsman International LLC, a subsidiary of the chemical giant Huntsman Corp., has agreed to pay $33 million to settle a class action suit alleging anticompetitive practices.
The direct purchaser plaintiffs claim that five major chemical companies, BASF, Dow Chemical, Bayer, LyondellBasell, and Huntsman, colluded to fix the price of feedstock used to make polyurethane foam. They point to repeated instances of simultaneous and identical price increases as evidence for their claim that a conspiracy to maintain artificially high prices existed.
These five players allegedly wield exclusive control of the U.S. polyurethane feedstock market. Plaintiffs alleged that this, combined with high barriers for market entry and feedstock’s status as an undifferentiated commodity, makes the industry particularly susceptible to price-fixing agreements.
Huntsman’s settlement acknowledges no wrongdoing. A spokesman for Huntsman said that the company wanted to avoid the expense of complex, long-term litigation and move forward with business.
The plaintiffs are very satisfied with the $33 million agreement, a figure that represents 1.4% of Huntsman’s sales during the contested period. LyondellBasell and Bayer have reached similar deals.
Counsel for the plaintiffs say they will continue to pursue the remaining defendants, BASF and Dow Chemical.
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Categories: Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
June 15, 2011
A justice of the British Columbia Supreme Court has ruled that an alleged worldwide diamond cartel led by rough diamond seller De Beers had sufficient anticompetitive impact on Canadian consumers to enable a price-fixing class action to survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage.
The plaintiff alleges that De Beers and the other defendants sought to eliminate competition in the sale of gem grade diamonds in British Columbia, Canada, and elsewhere, by fixing the price of gem grade diamonds and allocating the market for gem grade diamonds.
De Beers had argued that the court lacked jurisdiction of the claims in Fairhurst v. Anglo American PLC because only one of the defendants did any business in British Columbia. And all defendants traded only in rough diamonds, not the gem grade diamonds purchased by consumers like the plaintiff. De Beers argued that the defendants were far higher in the “diamond pipeline.” In the words of its expert, “any connection between the Defendant’s sales of rough diamonds on the one hand and the Plaintiff, other Proposed Class Members and any diamond jewelry purchases made in British Columbia on the other hand, is remote in the extreme.”
Madam Justice B.J. Brown, however, concluded that De Beers was not only higher in the “diamond pipeline”– it more or less owned the pipeline. The court noted that De Beers was long the largest producer of rough diamonds in the world, acted historically as the “diamond industry custodian,” and “possessed a degree of monopoly power in the rough diamond market for over a century.”
Drawing upon jurisdictional authority to hold foreign manufacturers liable for knowingly sending hazardous products into the stream of commerce in Canada, the court ruled that a “tortious conspiracy” such as the alleged worldwide diamond cartel is said to occur wherever damage from the conspiracy is suffered: “The defendants do not suggest that ‘their’ diamonds were not sold in British Columbia. The diamonds arrived in British Columbia in the ordinary course of De Beers’ business, and the defendants knew or ought to have known that the product would be sold in British Columbia.”
The court deemed allegations of a diamond cartel whose aim was to “creat[e] an overcharge” that would necessarily harm consumers was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction at this stage in the litigation.
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Categories: Antitrust Law and Monopolies, Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing, International Competition Issues
May 25, 2011
Skyrocketing gas prices may be getting an extra boost from anticompetitive conduct according to some Democratic legislators that are urging the Federal Trade Commission to investigate possible anticompetitive conduct by gasoline refineries.
Last week, Democratic senators, including Senators Claire McCaskill, Charles Schumer, Patty Murray and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, asked the FTC to investigate whether gasoline refiners have restrained supply of gasoline in order to increase prices. In a letter to Jon Leibowitz, the Chairman of the FTC, they questioned whether U.S. inventories may have been kept artificially low in order to maintain high gas prices, citing evidence that “refineries are using only 81.7 percent of their capacity, a decline of 7 percent from the same time last year.”
D.C. and Maryland attorneys general also recently announced investigations.
D.C.’s Attorney General is investigating Capitol Petroleum Group (“CPG”), D.C.’s largest owner of gas stations, for potential anticompetitive practices. CPG owns/operates a large number of gasoline stations in D.C. The investigation will center on whether CPG’s gas station holdings represent an illegal monopoly under D.C.’s antitrust law, and might also look into CPG’s primary owner’s dual role as a gas station owner and gas wholesaler through another company called DAG Petroleum. Four years ago, the D.C. Council repealed a law prohibiting wholesalers from owning individual service stations based on competition concerns. It might be revisiting that decision. CPG’s owner in a statement argued that the gas stations he owns are managed by individual franchisees which independently set the price of gas at the pump.
Maryland’s Attorney General is investigating “sudden and dramatic” increases in gas prices at a number of Maryland stations supplied by Empire Petroleum Holdings. Empire, a distributor, apparently told its retailers that prices had to be raised about 25 cents a gallon because of the Mississippi River flooding.
Both target companies are contesting allegations of anticompetitive conduct.
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Categories: Antitrust Law and Monopolies, Antitrust and Price Fixing
May 20, 2011
Plaintiffs in the case of In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litigation have convinced the court that tape recordings of conversations from a criminal investigation into alleged price fixing of packaged ice sold in retail stores and gas stations should not remain on ice.
Judge Paul Borman of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan has ordered the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to produce tape recordings and transcripts in response to the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ motion to compel. The production will be reviewed in camera by the judge to see whether there is any need for protection.
The plaintiffs are purchasers of packaged ice from defendants, including Reddy Ice, Arctic Glacier, and Home City Ice, three major players in the packaged ice industry.
The tape recordings and transcripts at issue allegedly involve former employees of the defendant ice manufacturers and allegedly incriminate a number of potential witnesses in the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ civil antitrust case.
The tapes and transcripts were collected during the DOJ’s criminal antitrust investigation of the defendants. As part of its investigation, the DOJ collected the tapes and documents at issue by recruiting individuals to record conversations with people integral to the alleged conspiracy – a common practice to investigate conspiratorial activities. The criminal investigation ultimately led to guilty pleas from Arctic Glacier and Home City, as well as three former Arctic Glacier employees.
Two of the three original defendants to the civil action, Arctic Glacier and Home City, have already settled with the direct purchaser plaintiffs or are seeking settlement confirmation. Reddy Ice remains an active defendant.
The direct purchaser plaintiffs subpoenaed the DOJ and asked for the tapes and transcripts. The DOJ objected to the subpoena on the grounds of sovereign immunity and lack of jurisdiction, investigatory files privilege, law enforcement privilege, and work product protection.
Judge Borman found that the court had proper jurisdiction and that sovereign immunity did not bar the court’s review of the dispute. On the substance, the court held that the privileges and work product protection invoked by the DOJ did not justify shielding discovery by the direct purchaser plaintiffs. The judge seemed particularly persuaded by the argument that since the defendants’ counsel had access to the tapes and transcripts during the prior criminal investigation, denying the direct purchaser plaintiffs access would “significantly prejudice” plaintiffs’ discovery efforts.
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Categories: Antitrust Litigation, Antitrust and Price Fixing
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